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INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL 
UNION AND SEIU LOCAL 925 
 
Applying the National Labor Relations Board’s current standards under NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) and NLRB v. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), the Regional Director 
properly concluded that the Board had jurisdiction over the petition filed by Service Employees 
International Union Local 925, and correctly ordered an election among full-time and part-time 
contingent faculty at Pacific Lutheran University.  That decision should be upheld for the reasons 
stated in SEIU Local 925’s briefs to the Region and the Board.  However, given the substantial 
interest of the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) and many of its affiliates, 
including Local 925, in the standards governing the NLRA rights of employees at colleges and 
universities across the country, SEIU and Local 925 submit this brief amicus curiae in response 
to the Board’s questions regarding its standards under those two cases.  
 SEIU represents over 2 million workers in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico, 
including approximately 20,000 higher education faculty members in the United States.  SEIU 
faculty members work at private and public institutions of higher education, at research 
universities and community colleges, and at entities both religious and secular.  SEIU represents 
tenured, tenure-track, and contingent faculty who teach on both full-time and part-time 
schedules.  Those professors stand among over 80,000 SEIU members who work on college and 
university campuses, including medical professionals at university hospitals, support staff and 
paraprofessionals, cleaners, food service workers, and security officers.  
SEIU Local 925 is SEIU’s public services local in Washington State, representing 20,000 
workers across the state. Local 925 members work in early learning and childcare, K-12, 
institutions of higher education, public health, public defense, and in other governmental and 
non-profit entities serving the public. Local 925 is actively engaged in organizing campaigns of 
9
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higher education contingent faculty in Washington State, including the instant petition in PLU, 
and a pending petition in Seattle University, 19-RC-122863. 
 The interests of SEIU and SEIU Local 925 in this case also flow from SEIU’s national 
campaign to organize higher education faculty. At the date of this filing, SEIU and its local 
unions have six pending petitions concerning over 2,000 professors in Seattle, Oakland, Boston, 
Washington, D.C., and Baltimore, involving full- and part-time contingent professors at public, 
secular, and religiously-affiliated institutions. In some cases, the organizing efforts of these 
employees have been delayed and frustrated by employer challenges to the Board’s jurisdiction 
over their petitions, or by employer claims that these contingent faculty—by definition, 
professors who often do not know if they will secure a teaching contract until just days before a 
term begins—are “managers” who exert meaningful authority over the operations of their 
employer.   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
The Board should abandon the “substantial religious character” test it has adopted for 
applying Catholic Bishop. Such an inquiry into the nature of the institution as a whole is 
logically distinct from the question that is relevant under Catholic Bishop: whether the Board can 
assert jurisdiction over a particular unit of teachers without creating a risk of entanglement 
between government and religion. It also raises the specter of a wide-ranging, constitutionally 
problematic inquiry into whether a school is “sufficiently religious.” And it wrongly suggests 
that Catholic Bishop applies to non-teachers, and thus that cleaners, food service workers, 
security officers, and other non-teaching employees at religiously affiliated colleges and 
universities across the country do not have rights under the National Labor Relations Act.  
10
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Instead, in applying Catholic Bishop the Board should ask whether the teachers in the 
unit perform religious functions as part of their jobs—specifically, whether it is part of their job 
duties to teach or inculcate religious beliefs, and whether they can be terminated or disciplined 
based on religious criteria. This approach should be based on the institution’s own public 
statements about the nature of the teachers’ jobs. This inquiry, which is similar to the approach 
the Supreme Court recently took in the “ministerial exception” case Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), would serve as a much more 
effective “market check” than does the test set forth in the D.C. Circuit’s Great Falls and Carroll 
College decisions.  
Under this “teacher religious function” test, the Board can assert jurisdiction over 
contingent faculty at PLU without implicating any of the constitutional problems the Court 
perceived in Catholic Bishop. 
In addressing the Board’s questions concerning Yeshiva, we take the Supreme Court at its 
word: that the Yeshiva case was meant to create a starting point for assessing the managerial 
status of university professors, not a rigid test. We decline to sort or prioritize the array of factors 
that the Board has built up in the 34 years since the Yeshiva decision. Instead, we propose an 
approach stripped down to the two questions regarding managerial status posed by the Supreme 
Court in Yeshiva: Do faculty in the unit substantially and pervasively operate the enterprise that 
employs them, and are their professional interests inseparable from those of the enterprise? This 
approach creates space for the Board to consider the factors most relevant to the evolving 
business of higher education, rather than anchoring its analysis on the facts that happened to be 
present in Yeshiva.  
11
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 We begin by describing how the landscape of higher education has changed since the 
Supreme Court decided Yeshiva in 1980. We then propose that the Board include as part of its 
analysis two factors that have been ignored or not sufficiently prominent in the Board’s 
jurisprudence. First, the Board must factor in the size and duties of university administrators, the 
“managerial professionals” that in fact operate the enterprise. Second, the Board should assess 
the “unbundled” duties of the institution’s contingent professors who have little control over the 
academic and personnel decisions of their employer. Faculty hired strictly or primarily to teach 
are academic professionals, but not managers. 
ARGUMENT 
I. In Applying Catholic Bishop to Determine if a Particular Unit of Teachers Is 
 Exempt from Board Jurisdiction, the Board Should Consider Whether Those 
 Teachers Perform Religious Functions as Part of their Jobs. 
 
The first question the Board posed in this case— “What is the test the Board should apply 
under NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), to determine whether self-identified 
‘religiously affiliated educational institutions’ are exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction?” —
highlights what is wrong with the approach the Board has taken to applying Catholic Bishop. 
That case is not about whether an entire institution is “exempt from Board jurisdiction.” Rather, 
it is about whether the Board can assert jurisdiction over a particular unit of teachers.  
The Board should abandon its “substantial religious character” test in favor of a test, 
based on the Court’s reasoning in Catholic Bishop, that asks whether teachers in the petitioned-
for bargaining unit perform religious functions as part of their jobs.   
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A. Catholic Bishop Does Not Exempt Entire Institutions From Board 
Jurisdiction, But Only Units of Teachers Whose Jobs Include Religious 
Functions. 
 
 Catholic Bishop asked “[w]hether teachers in schools operated by a church to teach both 
religious and secular subjects are within the jurisdiction granted by the National Labor Relations 
Act.” 440 U.S. at 491 (emphasis added). In interpreting the Act to exclude teachers in religious 
secondary schools, the Court repeatedly emphasized that it was “the teacher’s function in a 
church school” that led to the “danger that religious doctrine will become intertwined with 
secular instruction.” Id. at 501 (emphasis added); see also id. (the “critical and unique role of the 
teacher in fulfilling the mission of a church operated school”); id. (“key role played by teachers” 
in a religious secondary school).  
The Court’s discussion of two specific ways Board jurisdiction over teachers would 
present a risk of entanglement also made clear that it was the religious aspects of the teachers’ 
jobs that led to those risks. First, because the teachers could be terminated or disciplined for 
religious reasons, the Board’s adjudication of unfair labor practice charges might require it to 
judge the religious good faith of the administrators in making such decisions. Id. at 502. Second, 
because the teachers’ jobs involved “the propagation of a religious faith,” id. at 503, the Board’s 
determination of which terms and conditions of employment were mandatory subjects of 
bargaining would intertwine the Board with religious matters. Id. at 502-03. 
When the Court did comment on the “substantial religious character” of the church-
operated high schools in that case, id. at 504, it did so only by way of explaining why the 
teachers’ job functions were inherently intertwined with spreading religious values. The 
“admitted and obvious fact that the raison d’etre of parochial schools is the propagation of a 
religious faith,” id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 628 (1971)) was relevant 
13
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because it explained why “[t]he church-teacher relationship in a church-operated school differs 
from the employment relationship in a public or other nonreligious school” and why the Board’s 
exercise of jurisdiction would present constitutional problems. Id. 
Properly read, then, Catholic Bishop does not “exclude church-operated schools, as entire 
units, from the coverage of the NLRA.” NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th 
Cir. 1991). And it has no application to employees other than teachers. Rather, “Both the 
rationale and the language of the Catholic Bishop opinion . . . support the limitation of its 
holding to the employment relationship between church-operated schools and its teachers.” Id. at 
1302.  
Also, importantly, Catholic Bishop exempts from Board jurisdiction only teachers who 
are under an “obligation . . . to imbue and indoctrinate the student body with the tenets of a 
religious faith.” NLRB v. Bishop Ford Cent. Catholic High Sch., 623 F.2d 818, 823 (2d Cir. 
1980). It is the “commitment of the faculty to religious values no matter what subject in the 
curriculum is taught and the obligation to propagate those values which provides the risk of 
entanglement.” Id. The Catholic Bishop Court found that at church-operated high schools, such 
“propagation” was inherent in the jobs of all teachers. 440 U.S. at 503. But when the Board 
began to apply Catholic Bishop to colleges and universities, it recognized that this is not true for 
institutions of higher education. It thus announced that it would apply Catholic Bishop to 
colleges and universities only on a “case-by-case basis.” St. Joseph’s College, 282 NLRB 65, 68 
n.10 (1986). In the context of higher education it is all the more important that the Board 
determine whether the teachers at issue actually perform religious functions before applying the 
Catholic Bishop exception. 
14
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B. The Board’s “Substantial Religious Character” Test and the D.C. Circuit’s 
“Religious Educational Environment” Test Share a Mistaken Focus on the 
Religious Character of the Institution as a Whole. 
 
While Catholic Bishop focused on the job functions of Catholic high school teachers, it 
did not establish a generally-applicable test for determining whether a unit of teachers at a 
religious school was beyond the Board’s jurisdiction. Carroll College v. NLRB, 558 F.3d 568, 
571 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The task of crafting an appropriate test was left to the Board. In many of 
the cases in which it has applied Catholic Bishop, the Board has focused on the job functions of 
the petitioned-for unit of teachers. See, e.g., Livingston College, 286 NLRB 1308, 1309 (1987) 
(“Of more significance is the fact that faculty members are not required to conform to AME 
doctrine or promote the ideals and objectives of the AME Church”). But as it developed its test, 
the Board began increasingly to frame its inquiry as being about whether the school as a whole 
has “substantial religious character,” University of Great Falls, 331 NLRB 1663, 1664 (2000), 
and whether the entire “entity is . . . exempt from Board jurisdiction under Catholic Bishop.” 
Carroll College, 345 NLRB 254, 257 (2005).   
In reviewing the Board’s Great Falls and Carroll College decisions, the D.C. Circuit 
accepted the Board’s framing of the issue as whether the whole institution was exempt from the 
Act. The D.C. Circuit took issue with what it saw as the excessively probing and wide-ranging 
nature of the Board’s inquiry and so formulated its own test, which boils down to the question of 
whether the school “holds itself out to students, faculty and the community as providing a 
religious educational environment.” Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1343-45 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002).1  
                                                 
 
1 The D.C. Circuit explained its Great Falls test as having three prongs: (1) Does the school hold itself out to 
students, faculty, and the community as providing a religious educational environment; (2) is it a nonprofit, and (3) 
is it affiliated with, owned, operated, controlled, directly or indirectly, by a recognized religious organization or with 
15
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The Board and the D.C. Circuit tests share the flaw of focusing on the religious 
“character,” or “environment,” of the university as a whole. Not only are the concepts 
“substantial religious character” and “religious educational environment” highly vague and 
subjective, but the religiosity of a university as a whole does not answer the question whether the 
Board’s exercise of jurisdiction over a particular unit of teachers will raise the sorts of 
entanglement problems the Court identified in Catholic Bishop. Just as the Board has properly 
asserted jurisdiction over child care teachers whose job was to provide child care and not to 
proselytize, even though the day care center at which they worked was motivated by religious 
faith to provide care to children, Salvation Army of Massachusetts Dorchester Day Care Center, 
271 NLRB 195, 198 (1984), it is consistent with the Act for the Board to assert jurisdiction over 
faculty members whose job is to teach and not to propagate religion, even if their university is 
sincerely motivated by religious faith to provide a higher education dedicated to academic 
freedom. Indeed, it is telling that in explaining why its religious motivations entitle it to the 
Catholic Bishop exception, PLU cites Martin Luther’s discussion of a Lutheran cobbler moved 
by religious belief to make good shoes. Employer’s Request for Review at 20. As sincere as the 
cobbler’s beliefs and motivation may be, the Board should still be able to assert jurisdiction over 
his employees, whose job is simply to make shoes.2 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
an entity whose membership is determined at least in part with reference to religion. 278 F.3d at 1343. But since the 
overwhelming majority of colleges and universities in the United States are organized as nonprofits and have some 
religious history and ongoing affiliation, however tenuous, the Great Falls test amounts to a single prong, one 
focused on the school’s own representations about its “religious educational environment.”  
 
2 We note that any hesitation about the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over nonprofit institutions in general, see 
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504-05 (“congressional attention [in passing the NLRA] focused on employment in 
private industry and on industrial recovery”); Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1344 (“Accordingly, non-profit institutions 
have a more compelling claim to a Catholic Bishop exemption than for-profit businesses”), has no application to the 
world of colleges and universities, which are unquestionably engaged in commercial activity on a large scale. The 
private non-profit higher education sector takes in over $160 billion in net revenues annually. Data from the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, National Center for Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/. 
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The Board’s “substantial religious character” test and the D.C. Circuit’s “religious 
educational environment” test also both suffer from the flaw that they suggest that if a school has 
the requisite religious character, then all of its employees regardless of their function are not 
covered by the NLRA. While some schools have certainly urged this result, see Saint Xavier 
University, 13-RC-092296 (unit of housekeepers), the Board has not so held, nor should it. It 
would frustrate the purposes of the Act for the overall religious nature of a university to 
determine whether a unit of non-teachers whose jobs are indistinguishable from those at secular 
schools could exercise their rights under federal law. 
C. The Experience of SEIU Locals in Representing Non-Teaching Staff  at 
Religiously Affiliated Colleges and Universities Demonstrates that Such 
Representation Furthers the Purposes of the Act Without Creating Excessive 
Entanglements. 
 
SEIU Local 32BJ represents some 1,500 non-teaching staff, including cleaners, cafeteria 
workers, and security guards at over a dozen religiously-affiliated colleges and universities. 
These schools are often major employers in their metropolitan areas.3 They include Boston 
College, Providence College, St. John’s University, Fordham University, Yeshiva University, 
Duquesne University, Villanova, Georgetown, and Catholic University. Local 32BJ also 
represents workers at secular colleges and universities in the same geographic areas. The workers 
Local 32BJ represents perform the same functions—cleaning, preparing and serving food, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Qualms about the Act’s extension to nonprofits explicitly undergirds the Board’s decision not to assert jurisdiction 
over churches and other religious organizations. See, e.g., St. Edmund’s Roman Catholic Church, 337 NLRB 1260 
(2002); Riverside Church, 309 NLRB 806 (1992). This line of cases is distinct from, and should not affect, the 
Catholic Bishop line. Churches and similar institutions are exempt from Board jurisdiction because of the Board’s 
conclusion that they are not engaged in commercial activity. Riverside Church, 309 NLRB at 807. Given that 
reasoning, it makes sense that all the employees of such entities are exempt from Board jurisdiction. But under 
Catholic Bishop it is the risk of entanglement if the Board asserts jurisdiction over particular teachers that is at issue. 
Thus it does not make sense to exempt an entire institution based on a properly performed Catholic Bishop analysis.   
3 In the District of Columbia, for instance, Jesuit-affiliated Georgetown University is the largest non-governmental 
employer, and Catholic University is the tenth. District of Columbia 2013 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 
at 184, available at 
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/Demographic%20and%20Economic%20Inf
ormation_0.pdf. 
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providing security services—whether they work at religiously-affiliated universities or purely 
secular universities. For many years, 32BJ and its predecessors have bargained on behalf of these 
workers, both with universities and with contractors, over the same issues whether the schools 
are secular or maintain a religious affiliation: wages, benefits, hours of work, just cause 
protection, layoff and recall rights, grievance and arbitration systems, and seniority. In fact, with 
the exception of seasonal lay-offs and tuition reimbursement benefits, the issues for cleaners, 
security officers, and food service workers are the same whether the employees work at a 
university or a downtown office building (in fact, sometimes universities have satellite campuses 
in downtown office buildings). 
Local 32BJ’s bargaining history at religiously-affiliated colleges and universities 
demonstrates that giving employees at these institutions the right to engage in collective 
bargaining does not lead to excessive entanglement. Consistent with federal labor policy, the 
parties have tended to “exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements 
concerning rates of pay, hours, and working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 174(a)(1). While the Union 
has sometimes had occasion to file charges with the Board accusing one or more of these 
institutions of failing to bargain in good faith, those charges have been resolved without any need 
for the Board to consider the religious mission of these schools.4 
                                                 
 
4 Other SEIU local unions represent faculty at various colleges and universities, including some with religious 
affiliations, such as Georgetown University. The topics over which the union bargains on behalf of faculty members 
at both religiously affiliated and secular schools include pay, benefits, time off, funding for professional 
development, assignments, evaluations, discipline, grievances and arbitration, faculty workload, labor-management 
committees, access to office space, seniority, non-discrimination, and deduction of dues, fees, and contributions.  
 
Bargaining over these matters for faculty members presents no greater risk of excessive entanglement than when 
health care employees bargain with religiously affiliated health care institutions. See St. Elizabeth Community 
Hospital, 259 NLRB 1135 (1982), enf’d. 708 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding no constitutional obstacle to 
asserting jurisdiction over hospital owned and operated by a pontifical order of the Roman Catholic Church). 
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The Board has previously noted that “there is abundant evidence that, in collective 
bargaining, unions are able to obtain higher wages for the employees they represent … when the 
employees of employers in the same competitive market are unionized.” United Food and 
Commercial Workers Locals 951, 7 and 1036 (Meijer, Inc.), 329 NLRB 730, 734 (1999). Thus, it 
follows that if the Board were to find that the service workers at religiously-affiliated colleges 
and universities do not have the right to engage in collective bargaining, not only would it likely 
drive down their wages and benefits, but it would have a ripple effect, driving down the wages 
and benefits of cleaners, security officers, and food service workers in those labor markets where 
religiously-affiliated universities are major employers.  
One illustration of the irrationality of a rule that would exempt religious universities as a 
whole from the Board’s jurisdiction comes from the fact that many universities contract out the 
work of cleaners, food service workers, and security guards. The job functions of those workers 
do not change whether they are employed by the university itself or by private contractors; nor 
should the workers’ rights to form a union. But whereas a religiously-affiliated university might 
argue that Catholic Bishop should apply to prevent its own cleaning staff or other non-teaching 
employees from forming a union, see Saint Xavier, 13-RC-092296, there could be no such claim 
about cleaners employed by a contractor to clean the same university buildings. 
D. The Board Should Adopt a “Teacher Religious Function” Test, Focusing on 
Whether, According to the School’s Own Public Statements, the Teachers in 
the Petitioned-For Unit Perform Religious Functions. 
 
 The Board should abandon the “substantial religious character” test in favor of a “teacher 
religious function” test that asks whether the teachers in the petitioned-for bargaining unit 
perform religious functions. Specifically, the Board should examine whether the teachers are 
hired or can be disciplined or fired based on religious criteria, and whether they are required as 
19
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part of their jobs to promulgate religious beliefs. The examination should be based primarily on a 
school’s own public statements about its teachers’ job functions. This evidence could include job 
descriptions; employment contracts; faculty handbooks; and school statements to accrediting 
bodies,5 the public, and prospective faculty and students as to whether the teachers are required 
or expected to teach religious doctrines or beliefs.    
 
1. The “Teacher Religious Function” Test is Consistent With
 Catholic Bishop.  
 
As discussed above, Catholic Bishop turned on the “critical and unique role” teachers 
play “in fulfilling the mission of a church-operated [high] school.” 440 U.S. at 501. Specifically, 
because the Catholic Bishop teachers could be disciplined or terminated based on religious 
criteria and were required as part of their jobs to “propagat[e] a religious faith,” id. at 503, the 
Board’s exercise of jurisdiction over them could entangle the government with religion. The 
“teacher religious function” test, focusing on whether teachers are hired or can be disciplined or 
fired based on religious criteria, and whether their job functions include teaching religious 
beliefs, would thus identify those cases that involve the risks at issue in Catholic Bishop.  
 
                                                 
 
5 For instance, to be accredited by the Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities (NWCCU), a school 
must complete a Self-Evaluation Report in which it addresses five “Standards for Accreditation.” Each Standard is 
made up of a number of “criteria.” One of these (criteria 2.A.23) requires that if a school “requires its constituencies 
to conform to specific codes of conduct or seeks to instill specific beliefs or world views, it gives clear prior notice 
of such codes and/or policies in its publications.” Criteria 2.A.28 specifies that “While the institution and individuals 
within the institution may hold to a particular personal, social, or religious philosophy, its constituencies are 
intellectually free to examine thought, reason, and perspectives of truth. Moreover, they allow others the freedom to 
do the same. NWCCU, Standards for Accreditation (Revised 2010) at 4, available at 
http://www.nwccu.org/Pubs%20Forms%20and%20Updates/Publications/Standards%20for%20Accreditation.pdf.  
 
PLU is accredited by NWCCU, suggesting that it must have represented itself as complying with both of these 
requirements. PLU’s accreditation Self-Evaluations are not part of the record in this case. Some of its past Self-
Reports are available on its website, see http://www.plu.edu/accreditation/, but none of these address criteria 2.A.23 
or 2.A.28.  
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2. The “Teacher Religious Function” Test Would Avoid the 
Entanglement Problems the D.C. Circuit Perceives in the “Substantial 
Religious Character” Test, and Would Serve as a Better “Market 
Check” Than Does the D.C. Circuit’s “Religious Educational 
Environment” Test. 
 
The test proposed here would also avoid the entanglement problems the D.C. Circuit 
perceives in the “substantial religious character” test.  By looking specifically at teachers’ 
functions and relying on the university’s own public representations, the Board would avoid the 
entanglement problems the D.C. Circuit perceives in its attempts to assess the degree of a 
school’s “religious character.” For instance, in this case, PLU asserts that it does have substantial 
religious character because the education it provides is inspired by Lutheran values as it 
understands them, one of which is academic freedom. But there is no need for the Board to 
resolve a debate over whether academic freedom is a Lutheran or secular value, or both. That 
metaphysical dispute does not affect the answer to the relevant question: whether the jobs done 
by PLU contingent faculty are such that the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over them would 
create a risk of entanglement.  
 Shorn of language about the religious character of a school, it would also be clear that a 
Board decision to exercise jurisdiction over teachers at a religiously-affiliated school does not 
constitute “discrimination” against that school for being “not religious enough.” Cf. Great Falls, 
278 F.3d at 1346 (stating that limiting the Catholic Bishop exception to religious institutions 
“with hard-nosed proselytizing” might violate the Establishment Clause command not to prefer 
some religions to others). The Board does not discriminate when it asserts jurisdiction over units 
of employees who are covered by the clear language of the Act and whose jobs present no 
Catholic Bishop problems, any more than it “discriminates” against profitable corporations when 
it asserts jurisdiction over entities whose revenues exceed its jurisdictional floors.  
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Our proposed test would serve as a far more effective “market check” than does the D.C. 
Circuit’s “religious educational environment” test. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that its test would 
ensure that “institutions availing themselves of the Catholic Bishop exemption are bona fide 
religious institutions” because a public identification of a school as religious would “come at a 
cost” in that it would “dissuade” some students and faculty from wanting to attend or work at the 
school. 278 F.3d at 1344. But the real “market check” dynamics are well illustrated by this case. 
Potential students or faculty members seeking to avoid (or find) a religious school would be 
unlikely to be dissuaded (or persuaded) by PLU’s abstract statements about its fealty to its 
Lutheran history and traditions, especially in light of the fact nearly all private colleges and 
universities have religious histories. Rather, these potential students or faculty members would 
want to know about whether teachers are hired or evaluated on the basis of religious criteria and 
whether they are expected to inculcate religious beliefs in their classes. This is precisely why 
accreditation standards require universities which “seek to instill specific beliefs or world views” 
to give “clear notice” of that in their publications. NWCCU Accreditation Criteria 2.A.23, supra 
note 5.  
When it comes to those more concrete questions, the PLU website lands decidedly on the 
side of reassuring students that its faculty will not propagate religious beliefs: “Lutheran heritage 
is very important to our school, that doesn’t mean it will be forced on you.” Regional Director’s 
Decision & Direction of Election at 4 (NLRB Region 19, June 7, 2013) (hereinafter “Dec. & Dir. 
of Election”). PLU’s publications do not suggest that its professors will teach religious beliefs. 
Rather, the religion department’s website promises no “religious indoctrination.” Id. Potential 
faculty would likewise find in PLU’s job postings, teaching contracts, and faculty handbook no 
mention of religious requirements or functions. Id. at 5. This more robust market check would 
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allow the Board to take schools at their word about whether their teachers perform religious 
functions.  
  
3. The “Teacher Religious Function” Test is Similar to the 
 Approach the Supreme Court Took in Hosanna-Tabor. 
 
The Supreme Court adopted an approach similar to the one we advocate here in its recent 
Hosanna-Tabor decision. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 
S.Ct. 694 (2012). In that case, a “called teacher” at an elementary school operated by a church 
was terminated after she took disability leave. The EEOC brought suit claiming that her 
termination was in retaliation for her exercise of her rights under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act. The employer maintained that the teacher was a “minister” and that her termination was for 
a religious reason, namely that her threat to sue unless she was allowed to return to work violated 
the church’s belief that Christians should resolve disputes internally.  
The Supreme Court held that the suit was barred by the “ministerial exception,” a First 
Amendment doctrine that creates an exemption to employment discrimination legislation for 
claims by ministers against their religious employers. Permitting the government to intrude into 
the decision as to whether a church should hire or terminate a minister would, the Court said, 
“depriv[e] the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.” 132 S. 
Ct. at 706. Justice Alito elaborated, in a concurrence joined by Justice Kagan, that a court 
probing into the “real” reason for the termination would have to make “judgment[s] about church 
doctrine,” and that the “mere adjudication of such questions would pose grave problems for 
religious autonomy.” Id. at 715. These concerns echo those expressed by the Catholic Bishop 
Court that permitting the Board to adjudicate unfair labor practice charges involving teachers at 
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religious schools would involve Board “inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by the 
clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school’s religious mission.” 440 U.S. at 502. 
Having decided there was a ministerial exception, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor went on 
to determine whether it applied in that case. The Court did not simply take the employer at its 
word that the teacher in question was a “minister,” even though Justice Thomas wrote separately 
to argue that the Religion Clauses require courts to “defer to a religious organization’s good-faith 
understanding of who qualifies as a minister.” 132 S.Ct. at 710. The Court instead performed a 
targeted but substantive exploration that included a discussion of the teacher’s job functions and 
training. The Court discussed the fact that the school publicly held out the plaintiff as a minister 
and that her job description made clear she had “ministerial responsibilities”; that she had 
undergone a significant amount of religious training and a “formal process of commissioning”; 
that she held herself out as a minister; and that her job duties “reflected a role in conveying the 
Church’s message and carrying out its mission.” Id. at 707-08. In light of all this, the Court 
concluded she was covered by the ministerial exception. Id. at 708.  
Hosanna-Tabor demonstrates that the “teacher religious function” test does not 
improperly entangle the Board or the courts with the employer’s religious beliefs. The Hosanna-
Tabor Court appropriately inquired into the title the employer had given the teacher, into the 
“substance reflected in [her] title,” and into the specific “religious functions she performed for 
the church.” Id. at 708. The Board in applying Catholic Bishop can thus similarly ask whether 
the employer holds out its teachers as performing religious functions. 
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E. The “Teacher Religious Function” Test Shows that the Board Should  Assert 
Jurisdiction over the Contingent Faculty at PLU. 
 
As applied to the instant case, the “teacher religious function” test shows that the Board’s 
assertion of jurisdiction over the contingent professors at PLU would be entirely consistent with 
the Act. As the Regional Director found, “no adherence to Lutheran doctrine or membership in a 
Lutheran congregation is required for hiring, promotion, or tenure, nor does it play any role in 
faculty evaluations.” Dec. & Dir. of Election at 5. The teaching contracts of the contingent 
faculty “do not mention God, religion in general (except the religion department), or 
Lutheranism in particular. The faculty witnesses stated that they were never instructed to 
disseminate the Lutheran faith.” Id. There is “no provision in the University’s policies for 
disciplining or firing faculty if they do not hold to Lutheran values.” Id. at 16. The University’s 
religion department website states that “religion courses ask students to engage in the academic 
study of religion, not in religious indoctrination.” Id. at 4. At base, “faculty are subject to no 
religious requirements.” Id. at 16. Thus there is no risk of entanglement if the Board exercises 
jurisdiction over the petitioned-for unit of contingent faculty.  
II. The Board’s Application of Yeshiva Should Reflect the Realities of the 
 Modern Higher Education Landscape.  
 
 Applying the Board’s current analytical framework, the Regional Director properly 
concluded that the full-time contingent—also referred to as non-tenure-track—faculty at PLU are 
not managerial employees. Although this outcome was correct, the factors and criteria applied by 
the Regional Director fail to capture the realities of the modern higher education landscape, 
which has shifted dramatically in the 34 years since the Supreme Court decided Yeshiva. 
In 1975, when the Board granted Yeshiva University Faculty Association’s 
representation petition, tenured or tenure-track faculty comprised the majority of instructional 
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staff at nonprofit colleges and universities in the United States.6 By 2009, however, more than 
two-thirds of faculty members were ineligible for tenure.7 The dramatic rise in contingent faculty 
is attributable to fundamental changes in institutions of higher learning. Nonprofit colleges and 
universities have become more hierarchical due to the corporatization of higher education, the 
“unbundling” of faculty duties, and the ensuing re-conceptualization of the role of “shared 
governance.” In this new system, non-tenure-track educators have been relegated to a second-tier 
faculty status. Although tenured and tenure-track faculty have maintained a wider sphere of 
influence, their authority has likewise been eroded.  
A. Contingent Faculty Appointments have Increased Exponentially in the Past 
Three Decades. 
 
 Since Yeshiva was decided, there has been widespread adoption of the contingent faculty 
model, which entails non-tenure-track “faculty members working on a continuing basis—full-
time or part-time, in per-course or contractually limited appointments—without job security or 
the prospect of advancement to tenure lines or tenure equivalents.”8 In 1969, the vast majority—
nearly 80 percent—of faculty members were employed in tenured and tenure-track positions.9 
The precise opposite is true of today’s nonprofit colleges and universities where non-tenure-track 
                                                 
 
6 Pullias Center for Higher Education, The Changing Faculty and Student Success, 1 (May 2012), available at 
http://www.uscrossier.org/pullias/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Delphi-NTTF_National-Trends-for-Faculty-
Composition_WebPDF.pdf.  
7 Adrianna Kezar & Daniel Maxey, The Changing Academic Workforce, Trusteeship Magazine (May/June 2013), 
available at http://agb.org/trusteeship/2013/5/changing-academic-workforce. 
8 Committee on Contingent Labor in the Profession, Professional Employment Practices for Non-Tenure Track 
Faculty Members: Recommendations and Evaluative Questions, Modern Language Association, 1 (June 2011), 
available at http://www.mla.org/pdf/clip_stmt_final_may11.pdf. 
9 Adrianna Kezar et al., An Examination of the Changing Faculty: Ensuring Institutional Quality and Achieving 
Desired Student Learning Outcomes, Council for Higher Education Accreditation, 4 (Jan. 2014), available at 
http://www.uscrossier.org/pullias/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/CHEA_Examination_Changing_Faculty_2013.pdf. 
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positions account for more than 67 percent of faculty appointments.10 For-profit universities, 
meanwhile, rely almost exclusively on contingent faculty.11  
 Full-time non-tenure-track faculty appointments, in particular, are a relatively recent 
phenomenon. In 1969, full-time contingent faculty members represented only 3 percent of the 
faculty workforce. By 2003, they constituted 59 percent of new hires.12 
 Moreover, as the proportion of tenured and tenure-track faculty positions has declined, 
the number of part-time, also referred to as adjunct, faculty has mushroomed. Part-time educators 
now comprise the majority of the faculty at private, nonprofit comprehensive universities.13 In 
fact, the number of adjunct faculty at nonprofit educational institutions has increased by more 
than 400 percent from 1970 to 2003, a growth rate that has radically outpaced full-time faculty 
appointments.14  
 Across institutional types, three of every four faculty appointments are for either full-time 
or part-time non-tenure-track positions.15 In other words, the contingent faculty workforce is now 
a mainstay of the academic profession. 
B. Institutional Changes Are Driving the Growth of the Contingent 
 Faculty Model. 
 
 In Yeshiva, the “the faculty [was] the school,” 444 U.S. at 676 n.4. But universities have 
changed substantially since then.  
                                                 
 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  
13 Pullias Center for Higher Education, supra note 6, at 2. 
14 Id. at 1.  
15 Adrianna Kezar, Embracing Non-Tenure Track Faculty: Changing Campuses for the New Faculty Majority x 
(Adrianna Kezar ed., 2012). 
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1. Educational Institutions Have Become More Corporate in Function 
and Structure. 
 
 The corporatization of higher education began in the early- to mid-1970s when colleges 
and universities began to embrace private sector business and management models. Educational 
institutions adopted corporate systems, in part, as a response to fluctuating enrollment demands 
and increasing competition from new institutional types, such as community colleges, non-
baccalaureate degree programs and for-profit universities. However, the shift was also dictated 
by external economic forces, namely declining government appropriations for higher 
education.16 As public funds became scarcer, nonprofit colleges and universities began courting 
private donors, corporations, and foundations to bolster their endowments.17 In the ensuing four 
decades, institutions of higher learning have also found ways to transform knowledge into a 
revenue-generating commodity—capitalizing on patentable research and copyrightable teaching 
materials.18 Indeed, “today’s educational institutions are busily striving to profit from teaching, 
research and all the other activities on campus—offering corporations the right to endow 
professorships, sponsor courses, bring the university’s scientific discoveries to market, [and] 
even advertise in campus bathrooms.”19  
 As institutions of higher learning have become more entrepreneurial, corporate influences 
have also influenced the way they are structured. Rather than being run by committees of 
professors, colleges and universities today are operated primarily by “managerial professionals” 
                                                 
 
16 Joe Berry, Reclaiming the Ivory Tower: Organizing Adjuncts to Change Higher Education 24 (2005). 
17 Jack H. Schuster & Martin J. Finkelstein, The American Faculty: The Restructuring of Academic Work and 
Careers 278 (2006). 
18 Gary Rhoades & Sheila Slaughter, Academic Capitalism in the New Economy: Challenges and Choices, American 
Academic, 38-39 (June 2004), available at http://www.aft.org/pdfs/highered/academic/june04/Rhoades.qxp.pdf. 
19 Rebecca Clay, The Corporatization of Higher Education, Monitor on Psychology, 50 (2008), available at 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2008/12/higher-ed.aspx. 
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who occupy “positions of bureaucratic power within [the] organization’s formal hierarchy.”20 
These high-level, career administrators oversee the work of professional personnel, such as 
admissions officers, human resources staff, and information technology specialists, to name a 
few. Together, these non-instructional professionals enable the institutions’ “practicing 
professionals”—the tenured, tenure-track, and non-tenure-track professoriate—to “use their 
professional expertise to perform the organization’s operational work,” primarily, education and 
research.21 Stated more succinctly, today’s university faculty comprises one tier within a formal, 
top-down, multi-tiered hierarchy where the business of designing and implementing an 
educational product is decoupled from the practice of teaching. 
 These trends are also evident at the highest levels of university administrations. 
“Increasingly, the presidents of higher education institutions are both seeing themselves as, and 
being labeled as, CEOs.”22 A larger proportion of governing board members, meanwhile, have 
substantial corporate training and experience. For instance, current and former private sector 
professionals comprise the majority of the voting membership on PLU’s Board of Regents, the 
university’s policy making and governing body.23  
 Like other governing boards, PLU’s Board of Regents is responsible for “chart[ing] a 
course for the university and striv[ing] to provide essential funds.”24 Because instructional costs 
consume a significant proportion of academic budgets, educational institutions make managing 
labor costs a budgetary priority. “Recent surveys of presidents and chief financial officers within 
higher education show declining support for tenure and a desire for greater institutional 
                                                 
 
20 David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1775, 
1834 (1989). 
21 Id. 
22 Rhoades & Slaughter, supra note 18, at 38-39. 
23 Pacific Lutheran University, Board of Regents, http://www.plu.edu/president/regents/home.php (last visited Mar. 
24, 2014). 
24 Id. 
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flexibility around employment: 17% of presidents said they would eliminate tenure, 11% would 
hire more adjuncts, 38% would increase teaching loads, and 66% preferred long-term contracts 
over tenure appointments.”25 The contingent faculty model satisfies nearly all of these objectives 
by providing a cheap, relatively expendable source of labor, similar to the at-will employment 
model embraced by the private sector. 
2. Educational Institutions Have Become More Stratified as They Have 
“Unbundled” Faculty Roles. 
 
 The traditional faculty model features a tenured or tenure-track faculty member whose 
work consists of a bundle of separate duties, specifically teaching, research, and service.26 In 
addition to instructional and research tasks, traditional faculty members are responsible for 
“institutional components like formal participation in department or campuswide governance 
committees or task forces or serving as faculty adviser to a student organization or club; off-
campus activities designed to develop new on-campus academic programs; local community 
service and boosterism (representing the college within the geographic community), perhaps 
service as an unpaid consultant to a community organization; direct service to the state, regional, 
or national professional associations in one’s discipline; and service on an accrediting team of a 
regional or a specialized accrediting association.”27 In today’s educational institutions, a 
significantly greater proportion of faculty work is “unbundled,” meaning divided, into separate 
components completed by specialized personnel appointed to implement each respective task. As 
                                                 
 
25 Adrianna Kezar, Changing Faculty Workforce Models, TIAA-CREF Institute, 4 (Nov. 2013), available at 
https://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/public/pdf/changing-faculty-workforce-models.pdf (parenthetical omitted). 
26 Schuster & Finkelstein, supra note 17, at 76. 
27 Id. at 77. 
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faculty members “work has been unbundled into teaching-, research-, or service-only roles,”28 
their sphere of influence has diminished accordingly. 
 Unbundling is not a new concept. Teaching, which involves material preparation, 
instruction, student interaction and assessment, has often been segmented into discrete tasks.29 
Teaching assistants are a common example of a way in which research universities “increase[] 
class size by dissociating the professor from assessment and interaction with students and 
limiting her or his expensive labor to preparation and delivery.”30 In the past three decades, 
however, technological innovations have rapidly accelerated the pace and extent of the 
unbundling of traditional faculty tasks. Online and distance education, in particular, enable 
schools to decouple instruction from curriculum development and assessment. Thus,  
as far as the scope and substance of faculty work is concerned, the external forces, 
especially the advent of on-line and distance education, clearly all reinforce the 
unbundling of faculty work roles (teaching split off from research and service) 
and the differentiation of professional tasks. Moreover, the restructuring of work 
roles and the resort to new types of appointments reinforce each other. That is, 
restructured (more specialized) work roles encourage the new kinds of part-time 
and temporary full-time appointments, while these new types of restructured 
appointments, in turn, foster significantly different, more specialized work roles.31 
 
 In other words, the unbundling of faculty work creates stratification within the faculty, 
specifically, but also within the educational institution, more broadly. Within the faculty, it 
perpetuates contingent faculty appointments. Yet, it also necessitates the hiring of non-
instructional professional staff, such as course facilitators and IT personnel.  Indeed, from 1997 
                                                 
 
28 Kezar, supra note 9, at 3. 
29 Schuster & Finkelstein, supra note 17, at 108. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 36. 
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to 2007, the number of non-instructional professional staff at colleges and universities grew by 
almost 50 percent.32  
 As faculty work becomes more fragmented, a smaller proportion of the faculty 
participates in service roles. By way of comparison, in 1969, approximately one-half of faculty 
members reported spending 10 percent or less of their time in administration; by 1998, more than 
two-thirds of full-time faculty reported spending 10 percent or less of their time on such 
activities.33As a result, educational institutions have become fragmented workplaces, in which 
both managerial and practicing professionals occupy more specialized, narrow roles within the 
academic hierarchy. 
3. The Reality of “Shared Governance” Has Changed Significantly Due 
to the Bureaucratization of the Modern Academic Workplace. 
 
 The corporatization of higher education coupled with the unbundling of faculty duties has 
transformed the function of “shared governance” within educational institutions. “The concept of 
shared governance between a university’s administration and its faculty, as envisioned in 
numerous statements since 1920 that led to the American Association of University Professor’s 
classic 1966 Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, is that the faculty takes the 
lead on matters of curriculum, pedagogy, and personnel, in which they are the experts, while the 
administration runs the business end, its forte.”34  
At today’s universities, however, the term “shared governance” is misleading. Tenure-
line faculty exercise a decreasing level of control over historically faculty-led decisions, such as 
curriculum delivery. Increasing numbers of “managerial professionals” such as deans, provosts, 
                                                 
 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 92. 
34 Don Eron, The Case for Instructor Tenure; Solving Contingency and Protecting Academic Freedom in Colorado, 
in Equality for Contingent Faculty: Overcoming the Two-Tier System 45 (Keith Hoeller ed., 2014). 
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and vice-presidents, exercise more unilateral authority over these institutional decisions because 
they implicate strategic considerations, including revenue-generating or cost-reducing potential, 
that extend beyond traditional instruction. 35  
“Shared governance” is a particular misnomer with respect to contingent faculty. 
According to a 2011 study conducted by the AAUP, even when full-time contingent faculty are 
involved in governance activities, the scope of their participation and recognition is 
circumscribed: nearly 38 percent reported that participating contingent faculty members must 
satisfy certain prerequisites, such as a specified minimum teaching load or a particular type of 
appointment; 68 percent indicated that full-time contingent faculty members were excluded from 
certain governance processes, such as personnel committees; and 88 percent reported that non-
tenure-track faculty are not compensated for their service contributions.36 At PLU, specifically, 
full-time contingent faculty may not vote on personnel recommendations; thus, they may not 
participate in the election of chairs or deans or in the hiring of new faculty.37 They are also not 
eligible to serve on standing faculty committees.38 Although PLU makes much of the fact that 
full-time non-tenure-track professors serve on the Faculty Assembly, these educators enjoy 
substantially less academic freedom due to their precarious employment status. With respect to 
the part-time contingent faculty at PLU, there is not even a pretense of “shared governance.” 
They are typically excluded from governance functions. As a result, non-tenure-track faculty 
members occupy a second-tier faculty status in which they have less authority and less academic 
protection. 
                                                 
 
35 Rhoades & Slaughter, supra note 18, at 48-49.  
36	American	Association	of	University	Professors,	The	Inclusion	in	Governance	of	Faculty	Members	Holding	
Contingent	Appointments,	2	(Jan.	2013),	available	at	http://www.aaup.org/file/contingent‐inclusion‐in‐
governance_0.pdf.	
37 Pacific Lutheran University, Faculty Handbook 32 (Sep. 2011), available at 
http://www.plu.edu/provost/Faculty%20Handbook/Faculty-Handbook-v14c%20asofJan212014.pdf. 
38 Id. 
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C. Contingent Faculty Work Low-Wage, Precarious Jobs, and Their 
 Interests Are Not Aligned with University Management. 
   
 As a result of these driving forces, contingent professors no longer reflect a trend in 
higher education; they represent the face of academia. Yet, unlike a tenured or tenure-track 
appointment, a contingent faculty position is not a secure, middle-class job. To the contrary, the 
central hallmarks of this new workforce are low pay, job instability and immobility, and second-
tier faculty working conditions.   
The poor working conditions and status of contingent faculty are completely at odds with 
the relative comfort and security of the professional administrators who in fact manage the 
business of nonprofit colleges and universities.  Even if contingent professors control academic 
matters within the ambit of their teaching duties, their professional interests are not at all aligned 
with the interests of the actual managers who decide – too often mere days before the start of 
classes – if their contracts will be granted or renewed for the upcoming term.  
1. Contingent Faculty Members are Paid Significantly Less than their 
Tenured and Tenure-track Counterparts.  
 
 Despite their educational pedigree, contingent faculty members are often low wage 
earners. Due in large part to the unbundling of faculty duties, non-tenure-track faculty members 
spend a greater proportion of their working hours in the classroom. However, they are paid 
considerably less than their tenured and tenure-track counterparts.39  Not only is adjunct faculty 
members’ base pay much lower, they are also economically disadvantaged by the fact that they 
are often ineligible for healthcare or retirement benefits through the educational institutions that 
employ them.40 
                                                 
 
39 Berry, supra note 16, at 8.  
40 Adjuncts & Contingents Together, Facts & Figures, http://actogetherwa.org/facts-figures/ (last visited Mar. 24, 
2014). 
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 Although the annual pay of a tenured professor at a private research university is well 
over $100,000,41 the 2010 median salary of a full-time non-tenure-track professor was $47,500.42 
Part-time contingent faculty members fare much worse. Unlike salaried educators, part-time 
“contingent faculty usually are paid a piece rate, a fixed amount of compensation for each unit 
produced, regardless of how much time it takes to produce.”43 In 2010, the average rate of pay 
per three-credit course was $2,700.44 Thus, to earn the equivalent of even their full-time 
contingent colleagues, part-time contingent faculty members would have to teach 17 three-credit 
courses per academic year—nine more classes than the standard, full-time course load for that 
period.45 
 The absence of benefits exacerbates the financial instability of adjunct faculty members. 
Approximately 79 percent do not receive healthcare benefits through their college or university 
and an estimated 86 percent do not receive retirement benefits or the option to buy into a group 
retirement plan.46 As a result, it is not uncommon for adjunct faculty members to rely on public 
assistance programs, such as food stamps and Medicaid, to fill the gap.47 
 
 
                                                 
 
41 Adjunct Action, The High Cost of Adjunct Living: Boston, 5 (2013), available at 
http://www.seiu509.org/files/2013/12/The-High-Cost-of-Adjunct-Living-in-Boston-12113.pdf. 
42 John W. Curtis & Saranna Thornton, Here’s the News: The Annual Report on the Economic Status of the 
Profession 2012-13, Academe, 10 (Mar.-Apr. 2013), available at http://www.aaup.org/file/2012-13Economic-
Status-Report.pdf. 
43 House Committee on Education and the Workforce Democratic Staff, The Just-in-Time Professor: Report 
Summarizing eForm Responses on the Working Conditions of Contingent Faculty in Higher Education 5 (Jan. 
2014), available at 
http://democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/sites/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/files/documents/1.24.14-
AdjunctEforumReport.pdf. 
44 Curtis & Thornton, supra note 42, at 9.  
45 House Committee on Education and the Workforce, supra note 43, at 5. 
46 Adjuncts & Contingents Together, supra note 40. 
47 House Committee on Education and the Workforce, supra note 43, at 5. 
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2. Contingent Faculty Members Lack Job Security and Advancement 
Opportunities. 
 
 The contingent faculty workforce represents a permanent fixture at colleges and 
universities across the nation; however, non-tenure-track faculty members rarely have the peace 
of mind that comes with permanent employment. To defray costs and adapt to declining 
government and endowment revenues, colleges and universities have embraced non-tenure-track 
educators as a source of cheap, expendable labor. Indeed, the contingent faculty model is 
purposefully structured to satisfy these twin goals: it enables educational institutions to offer 
short-term appointments, with limited job security, and no guarantee for advancement into tenure 
lines.  
 Most full-time contingent faculty members are hired for one-year appointments; thus, 
they are, by their very nature, temporary employees.48 Regardless of whether their contracts are 
renewed, their precarious employment status inevitably “constrains the academic freedom and 
undermines the effectiveness of the individuals holding them.”49 Adjunct faculty educators 
experience the additional vulnerability of being employed on a semester-by-semester basis.50   
Moreover, for full-time and part-time contingent faculty alike, university administrators 
routinely fail to hire or reappointment contingent faculty members until the days immediately 
preceding a new semester. Consequently, these practicing professionals are effectively excluded 
from pre-semester staff development, class preparation, school-wide and/or departmental 
orientation, curriculum development, and mentoring opportunities.51 
                                                 
 
48 Curtis & Thornton, supra note 42, at 13. 
49 Id. 
50 Kezar & Maxey, supra note 7, at 1.  
51 Id. 
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 As one report aptly noted, “a contingent academic position is not simply a ‘temporary’ 
way station on the road to a tenure-track faculty career.”52 According to a 2010 survey conducted 
by the Coalition on the Academic workforce, 89 percent of respondents had been teaching in a 
full-time contingent position for at least three years.53 Thirty-nine percent of that subset had been 
teaching for at least a decade.54 
3. Contingent Faculty Members Occupy a Second-Tier Faculty Status. 
 
 Despite their increased presence on college campuses, contingent faculty members, by 
and large, occupy a marginalized status within the academic institutional hierarchy.  They are 
frequently excluded from faculty committees, orientation programs, professional development 
opportunities and, for adjunct faculty, formal evaluation by administrators and/or faculty peers.55 
Because of the unbundling of faculty duties, adjunct faculty members, in particular, provide 
instruction, but little more. They rarely provide input into curriculum development and design; 
indeed, part-time faculty members are generally excluded from departmental meetings.56 Non-
tenure-track faculty members do not have comparable access to office space, computers and 
copiers, or other instructional materials, all of which compromise the standard of instruction they 
can provide students.57  
D. The Board Should Recognize These Significant Structural Changes in 
Higher Education and Modernize its Analysis under Yeshiva. 
  
Rather than crafting an approach for determining managerial status based on the critical 
questions set forth in Yeshiva, the Board has elevated the specific facts which happened to be 
                                                 
 
52 Curtis & Thornton, supra note 42, at 13. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55 Kezar, supra note 7.  
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
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present in Yeshiva to factors in a test. The result is an unworkable exercise of fitting current facts 
into lines drawn decades ago in a very different academic landscape, or the marginalization of 
certain relevant facts altogether. The Yeshiva Court did not mandate the Board’s current 
approach; it viewed its decision as a “starting point only” recognizing that “other factors not 
present here may enter into the analysis in other contexts.” 444 U.S. at 691 n. 31. The holding of 
Yeshiva allows ample room for the Board to take into account the significant ways in which 
higher education institutions and the nature of faculty’s professional responsibilities have 
evolved—changes that directly affect the managerial status analysis for faculty.  
We urge the Board to recognize these changed circumstances and modernize its approach 
in two ways. First, the Board should focus on the role of the university’s managerial 
professionals in the administrative apparatus and the extent to which they independently control 
the affairs of the institution. In the great majority of cases, faculty have an important advisory 
role but do not exert the kind of control over employer policies required to deem them managers 
under the high standards set in Yeshiva. Second, given the extent to which universities have 
stratified their faculty by employing professors with “unbundled” job responsibilities, the Board 
should acknowledge that professors hired primarily to teach—while they are professionals 
engaged in important work—are not managers.  
1. Yeshiva Requires the Board to Apply the Well-Established Legal 
 Principles of the Managerial Status Test to Faculty.   
 
The Board, with approval from the courts, has long defined managerial employees as 
those “who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative 
the decisions of their employer.” General Dynamics Corp., 213 NLRB 851, 857 (1974) (quoting 
Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 NLRB 320, 323 n.4 (1947)); see also Bell Aerospace, 
416 U.S. 267 (1974) (citing cases where courts have approved the Board’s definition of this 
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exclusion).  Managerial status is “reserved for . . . those who are closely aligned with 
management as true representatives of management.” Bell Aerospace, 219 NLRB 384, 385 
(1975). 
The Supreme Court in Yeshiva required the Board to apply this same legal standard in 
determining whether a unit of all full-time faculty at Yeshiva University were managerial.58 
Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682-83 (citing Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 283-89). The Court noted that 
managerial employees are “‘much higher in the managerial structure’ than the supervisors 
explicitly ruled out of the Act’s coverage by Congress, which ‘regarded [managers] as so clearly 
outside the Act that no specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary.’” Id. The 
exclusion must be interpreted narrowly to avoid denying statutory rights to employees, and 
accordingly the Board requires the party alleging managerial status to sustain a heavy burden of 
proof. See Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 261 NLRB 569, 572 n.17 (1982).  
The Yeshiva Court considered two questions.  First, it asked if any of the professors in the 
unit formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the 
decisions of their employer.  Second, the Court considered whether the professional interests of 
any bargaining unit employees were so closely aligned with management that the risk of divided 
loyalty would lead to the types of harms the Board sought to prevent in creating the managerial 
exclusion. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686-88. The second inquiry served to check that the underlying 
purpose of the managerial exclusion would be served: namely, ensuring that those employees 
whom the employer necessarily relies upon to take discretionary actions that formulate and 
                                                 
 
58 The Court recognized that “there may be institutions of higher learning unlike Yeshiva where the faculty are 
entirely or predominantly nonmanagerial. There also may be faculty members at Yeshiva and like universities who 
properly could be included in a bargaining unit.” Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 691 n.31. However, as the Board had 
approved a broad unit including all full-time faculty, the Court expressed no opinion on the factors that might be 
relevant at different kinds of institutions or with regard to different kinds of faculty, other than to suggest that its 
analysis was a “starting point only and that other factors not present here may enter into the analysis in other 
contexts.” Id. 
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effectuate management policies are completely removed from the risk of divided loyalty. Id. at 
689-90.  That “check” squares with the Court’s caution that not all professionals should be 
considered aligned with management, only those whose “activities fall outside the scope of the 
duties routinely performed by similarly situated professionals.” Id. at 690. 
In Yeshiva, the Court found that at least some full-time faculty in the unit met the high 
bar it set for determining managerial status at a university. Faculty exercised “extensive control” 
over academic and personnel decisions at the University and played a “crucial role . . . in 
determining other central policies of the institution.” Id. at 679 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). The Court found that professors were “in effect, substantially and pervasively operating 
the enterprise,” id., and that the faculty—not some other layer of management—“determines 
within each school the product to be produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the 
customers who will be served.” Id. at 686. The holding depended on a finding that the full-time 
faculty’s “authority in academic matters is absolute,” and to a lesser extent, the faculty played a 
“predominant role in faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion”—decisions 
which encompass characteristics of supervisory as well as managerial functions. Id.  
The Court also found that the “faculty’s professional interests—as applied to governance 
at a university like Yeshiva—cannot be separated from those of the institution.” Id. at 688 
(emphasis added). The record before the Supreme Court established that the university’s 
administrators viewed the faculty as the school, and viewed themselves as the “executive arm of 
the faculty.” Id. at 676 n.4.  
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2. Changes in Administrative Structures and the Realities of Contingent 
Faculty Roles Mean Few Faculty Meet the High Bar for Managerial 
Status Set in Yeshiva.  
 
a. The Board Must Consider the Relative Number and Role of the 
Institution’s Managerial Professionals to Determine the Actual 
Control Exercised by Professors. 
 
Managerial professionals are hired into high-level, administrative positions by 
universities to oversee the development and implementation of university policies. While these 
functions were historically filled from the ranks of tenured professors who would temporarily 
rotate to serve in various administrative capacities, many managerial professionals today are 
being hired into career administrator paths. Assessing the role of managerial professionals and 
their relationship to the practicing professionals at a particular university will reveal whether the 
administration is “acting as the executive arm of the faculty,” as it was in Yeshiva, or acting as an 
administrative “buffer” that effectively reviews, mediates, and negotiates faculty 
recommendations into university policies. See Loretto Heights College, 264 NLRB 1107, 
1121(1982) (finding administrative program directors acted as an effective buffer between 
faculty and top management); St. Thomas Univ., 298 NLRB 280 (1990) (finding that university 
did not rely on its faculty where there existed a division chair committee that possessed the 
academic expertise).  
In other managerial cases, the Board seeks to understand the authority of high-level 
managers, in order to put into context the role of allegedly managerial employees who occupy a 
lower place in the employer’s hierarchy. See, e.g., Scranton Tribune, 294 N.L.R.B. 692, 693 
(1989) (finding that a newspaper editor’s authority was merely within the scope of professional 
judgment, and subservient to the operative authority held by the executive editor); Upper Great 
Lakes Pilot, 311 N.L.R.B. 131, 132 (1993) (finding only directors, and not lake pilots, 
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managerial, as the directors owned enough stock to control the course of business). The role of 
the managerial professionals is especially important because the existence of an administrative 
“buffer” in modern day universities is no longer the exception, but is the norm. 
The vestiges of a Yeshiva-like collegiate system still exist at many non-profit universities 
and colleges, usually in the form of a faculty governance body. However, the expanding ranks of 
administration managerial professionals—hired to run the university with input and advice from, 
but not in partnership with, the faculty—have eroded the authority that faculty exercise through 
these governing bodies. As universities have become more entrepreneurial, managerial 
professionals have exercised more authority over academic decisions, which can lead to 
additional revenue streams.59 More importantly, however, they also have greater influence over 
curriculum development and delivery. For example, decisions regarding distance learning or 
online programs largely occur “outside the standard processes of academic governance.”60  
Universities often no longer rely on their faculty to shape the university’s product, the 
terms and conditions on which they offer that product, and the customers to be served. These 
priorities are independently determined by the increasingly large administration. From the 
perspective of university management associations like the Association of Governing Boards, the 
Yeshiva Court’s vision of true shared authority between the faculty and the administration is no 
longer even a normative aspiration for modern university governance systems, much less a 
reality.61 
                                                 
 
59 Gary Rhoades, Democracy and Capitalism, Academic Style: Governance in Contemporary Higher Education 16-
23 (2003), available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/chepa/gov/roundtable2003/rhoades.pdf. 
60 Id. at 21-22. 
61 Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, AGB Statement on Board Responsibility for 
Institutional Governance 2 (2010), available at 
http://agb.org/sites/agb.org/files/u3/Statement%20on%20Institutional%20Governance.pdf. 
42
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 10 [2015], Art. 64
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss10/64
35 
 
In this case, PLU employs a substantial number of managerial professionals, at multiple 
levels of authority in the administrative hierarchy, who have responsibility over an array of 
institutional policies that affect the university’s academic product. Employer Ex 5 (PLU Table of 
Organization). Four vice-presidents, in addition to the provost, make a host of university policy 
decisions. Under the provost are deans and directors, who have authority over each of the 
divisions and schools. Below them are associate deans and department chairs, who are hired into 
that role from among the tenured faculty members and report to the deans. Petitioner Ex 24 (PLU 
Academic Deans and Chairs 2012-2013), Tr. 22, 28. Directors and associate provosts also report 
to the provost and run other areas of academic life, such as “academic advising,” “curriculum,” 
and “military science.” Employer Ex 5. This extensive hierarchical administrative body is a 
compelling indication of an “effective buffer” that would warrant further review if this were a 
case about a unit of tenure-track faculty at PLU. 
b. The Board Should Find that Contingent Faculty Hired Primarily to 
Teach are Not Managers.  
 
Contingent professors have a different employment relationship with their employer 
institutions than traditional tenured or tenure-track faculty. They are hired to perform a 
specialized subset of professional duties for a limited contractual period and are paid 
substantially less than their tenure-track colleagues. While some full-time contingent professors 
are able to remain employed with one university for an extended period of time, this does not 
change the fact that they are in a tenuous and subordinate position at that institution. That 
distinction eliminates any possibility that they have the power to “formulate and effectuate 
management policies” or that their professional interests are “aligned with” the management that 
consigns them to this low-wage, insecure status. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682-83. 
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When a party asserts that contingent faculty are managerial, the Board must examine the 
“actual job responsibilities, authority, and relationship to management” of such faculty in order 
to determine whether, despite their temporary status and limited responsibilities, they participate 
in formulating or implementing management policies and whether they are aligned with 
management. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 290 n.19 (1974). The appropriate inquiry is not 
whether contingent faculty members have any participatory rights in a faculty governance 
system.62 That a university may decide to “rebundle” the duties of contingent faculty by 
permitting them to participate in select aspects of university faculty life does not change the fact 
that their functions and interests fundamentally diverge from those of management.  
Here, PLU did not proffer evidence that full-time contingent faculty formulate and 
effectuate management policies of the university. Rather, full-time contingent faculty members 
are hired by PLU on one-year contracts that specify fulfillment of temporary needs. These 
include filling in for regular faculty who are on sabbatical or other leave, providing expertise 
needed for a particular type of program that the school’s management has decided to launch, and 
meeting teaching needs in courses with high enrollment. See Tr. 98-105; ER Request for Review 
36-37. While PLU has offered a myriad of reasons for hiring full-time contingent faculty, it does 
not assert that one of those reasons is because they are needed to formulate and effectuate PLU 
management policies.  
The Board must deny PLU’s argument that the right of full-time contingent faculty to 
vote in the Faculty Assembly transforms contingent faculty into managerial employees who are 
                                                 
 
62 We do not consider, given the facts of this case, whether the tenure-line faculty at PLU are managerial employees, 
but if that question were before the Board, their participation in faculty governance structures should be just one 
among the factors considered in that analysis. See supra, at 33. 
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so closely aligned to management that they lose their statutory rights under the NLRA.63 There is 
no basis for reaching this conclusion. PLU relies on contingent faculty because it needs the 
flexibility to draw from a pool of qualified practicing professionals. Indeed, PLU itself notes: 
“The university has lower expectations for scholarly work and university service for contingent 
faculty than we do for tenure-line faculty, and some of our contingent faculty prefer to teach 
exclusively without the requirement to be productive scholars or active in committees and other 
service work of the university.”64 
    
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Regional Director’s decision should be affirmed. 
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63 PLU erroneously characterizes the full-time contingent faculty as having “exactly the same vote as tenure line 
faculty.” Employer’s Request for Review, 28. The record clearly indicates that full-time contingent faculty, unlike 
tenure-line faculty, do not have the same rights as they cannot vote on personnel matters in the Faculty Assembly. 
Faculty Handbook, 32; Tr. 56-57. 
64 Pacific Lutheran University, Summary for the ASPLU [Associated Students of Pacific Lutheran University], 1 
(Sept. 2013), available at http://www.plu.edu/provost/Contingent%20Faculty%20Information/home.php.  
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